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1. Introduction
According to the standard union threat model of wage determination, nonunion employers
strategically raise wages when faced with the threat of union organization. The higher wages, in turn,
reduce nonunion employment, as nonunion firms move up along their labor demand curves.1
While acknowledging that nonunion employers will take into account the effect of their wage choices
on workers' incentives to organize, standard union threat models effectively assume that those same
employers disregard the effect that their employment choices may have on workers' unionization
decision. In this paper, I develop a model in which nonunion firms set both wages and employment
strategically when faced with a threat of unionization. The model shows that if nonunion firms take into
⁎ Tel.: +34 916245801; fax: +34 916249607.
E mail address: pablo.ruiz@uc3m.es.
1 See Farber (2005) for a recent version of the union threat model and Ehrenberg and Smith (2005) for a textbook exposition.
Pencavel (1991, ch. 6) offers a more general analysis of the interaction between union and nonunion sectors.
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account the effect of their employment choices on workers' incentives to unionize, the prediction of the
standard threat model is reversed: instead of reducing employment, the threat of unionization increases
employment above competitive levels.
2
a
th
w
re
U
b
w
fi
li
3
in
re
p
u
ch
bargain collectively.
3 These costs reflect the time and effort workers need to put into organizing (or the fees and dues paid to union officials if
these activities are delegated to an existing union) and the costs stemming from potential retaliatory measures that employers
may take to fight the unionization attempt. See Kleiner (2001) for a recent assessment of these costs and their influence on
unionization.
Fig. 1. Sequence of events.
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2. Setup
Consider a nonunion firm that hires l workers from a pool of identical workers with reservation wage w¯
nd offers these workers a wage w to be paid after production takes place. Through on-the-job learning,
e l employees accumulate firm-specific skills, thus becoming more valuable for the firm than alternative
orkers. If they are not satisfied with the wage w initially offered by the firm, employees can unionize to
negotiate the wage so as to capture part of the quasi-rents generated by their firm-specific skills.2
nionization, however, entails organization costs C(l) for workers.3 If workers unionize, collective
argaining takes place, resulting in employment lu≤ l and a wage wu.
At the end of the period, revenues are generated and wages paid. The revenues generated by incumbent
orkers are described by the function R, with R′≥0 and R″b0. For simplicity, it is assumed that the
rm's revenues would be zero if it employed workers with no firm-specific skills. Fig. 1 displays the time-
ne of the model.
. Collective bargaining
When setting wages and employment, the firm will try to predict the effect of its choices on workers'
centives to unionize. These incentives, in turn, depend on the wage and employment levels that would
sult if workers unionized and bargained collectively with the firm. Therefore, to solve the model, I
roceed by backward induction and first analyze the collective bargaining stage that takes place if workers
nionize.
2 The assumption that workers have no individual bargaining power is made only for simplicity: none of the results would
ange qualitatively if we allowed for individual bargaining power, as long as employees' bargaining power is greater if they
Union-management bargaining is modelled by means of the commonly-used monopoly union model.
According to this model, the union imposes its wage demands on the employer, who then sets
employment at will. I assume that the union's objective is to maximize the total rents accruing to its
111P. Ruiz Verdú / Economics Letters 96 (2007) 109 115members, which is also one of the most usual assumptions in the literature:
Uðwu; luÞ ¼ luðwu− w¯Þ ð1Þ
As I discuss in Section 5, the particular choice of bargaining model or union objective function does notplay a
Le
followny essential role in deriving the results.
e well-known outcome of the monopoly union model is the wage–employment pair on the marginalTh
revenue product curve that yields the highest rents to the union (see Booth, 1995, ch. 4). Below, I extend
the usual model to account for the restriction that the level of skilled employment resulting from the
collective bargaining process (lu) cannot be greater than the number of workers with specific skills (l).
Therefore, once the union has set a wage wu, the firm sets lu≤ l such that R(lu)−wulu≥R(l'u)−wul'u, for
any l'u≤ l.
The union's problem can then be stated as follows:4
max
lu;wu
luðwu− w¯Þ ð2Þ
s:t: luVlRðluÞ−wuluzRðl0uÞ−wuluV; for any l0u≤1 ð3Þ
t wu(l) and lu(l) denote the solutions to this problem, and let ∏U(l)≡R(lu(l))−wu(l)lu(l). The
ing lemma describes the properties of wu(l), lu(l) and ∏U(l) (the proof is in the Appendix):Lemma 1. In the monopoly union model:
(A) wu(l) is nonincreasing in l.
(B) There exists a level of membership lu* such that:
B.1) For l≤ lu*, lu(l)= l
(B.2) For l≥ lu*, lu(l)= lu* and wu(l)=wu(lu*).
(C) ∏U(l) is increasing in l for lb lu*, and constant in l for lN lu*.
Result (A) implies that a larger membership will induce the union to accept a lower wage in exchange
for greater employment. Result (B) shows that for low levels of initial employment, the negotiated
outcome implies the employment, the union is not willing to concede any further reduction in wages and
instead accepts some unemployment (B.2). Result (B) thus implies that lu(l) is nondecreasing in l. Finally,
result (C) means that the profits of a unionized firm are nondecreasing in initial employment. This makes
sense: if the union raises wages and reduces employment, increasing initial employment will, according to
properties (A) and (B) counteract both effects, and should, thus, tend to increase profits. Note, however,
that (A) and (B) do not imply (C).
4 This formulation is equivalent to one in which the union selects wu to maximize lu(wu, l )(wu w¯), where lu(wu, l ) is the
solution to the firm's employment choice problem given w and l.u
3
4. Wage setting and union avoidance
Let wT(l) denote worker's expected payoff from unionization (bet of organization costs).
n
b
w
f
C
(l
w
f
P
w
w
a
5
e
e
a
m
o
(
a
112 P. Ruiz Verdú / Economics Letters 96 (2007) 109 115wTðlÞu luðlÞl wuðlÞ þ 1−
luðlÞ
l
 
w¯−
CðlÞ
l
ð4ÞFor
onun
As
Expany employment choice, l, the firm has to offer a wage at least as high as wT(l) if it wants to remain
ion. If wT(l)≤ w¯, the firm sets w¯ and avoids unionization. If wT(l)N w¯ and the firm offers a wage
wT(l), workers unionize and profits are ∏U (l)=R(lu(l))−wu(l)lu(l)). If the firm offers wT(l), andelow
orkers accept, profits are:
Pðl;wTðlÞÞ ¼ RðlÞ−lwT ðlÞ ¼ RðlÞ−wuðlÞluðlÞ− w¯ðl−luðlÞÞ þ CðlÞ ð5Þ
For lu* as defined in Lemma 1, it follows from properties (B.2) and (C) in Lemma 1 that∏U(lu*)≥∏U(l)ny l . Mo r eove r , luðl⁎uÞ ¼ l⁎u and wT ðl⁎uÞ ¼ w⁎u−
Cðl⁎uÞ
l⁎
; so Pðl⁎u;wT ðl⁎uÞÞ ¼ Rðl⁎uÞ−l⁎uwu⁎ þo r a
uðl⁎uÞNRðl⁎uÞ−l⁎uwu⁎ ¼ PU ðl⁎uÞ . Therefore if l* is the optimal employment level, it follows that Π(l*, wT
* ))≥Π(lu*, wT(lu* ))NΠU(l) for any l. In words, the firm can guarantee higher profits by setting l= l* and
=wT(l*) than by setting any employment–wage pair that leads to unionization, Therefore, we obtain the
ollowing result:
roposition 1. In equilibrium, the firm offers
w⁎ðl⁎Þ ¼ maxfwTðl⁎Þ; w¯g; ð6Þ
here l* is the optimal employment level, and workers accept the wage offer.proposed by the standard union threat view, in equilibrium, firms raise wages above w¯ to eliminate
orkers' incentives to organize. Only if C(l) is sufficiently large will the union threat become ineffective,
nd the wage remain at the competitive level.
. Employment determinationression (4) highlights that the wage necessary to forestall unionization depends on the level of
mployment, l. Therefore, the firm should take this influence into account when choosing its optimal
mployment level.
If l b l u
* , Property (B.1) in Lemma 1 implies that luðlÞ ¼ l; so that w⁎uðlÞ ¼ wuðlÞ− CðlÞl
nd Pðl; w⁎ðlÞÞ ¼ RðlÞ−wuðlÞl þ CðlÞ ¼ PUðlÞ þ CðlÞ.5 Therefore, for low levels of employment, the
aximum profit that the firm can obtain while avoiding unionization is equal to the profit the firm would
btain if workers unionized plus the costs that workers would have to incur so as to unionize. By property
C), we know that∏U(l) is increasing in l for lb lu*. Therefore, if C is nondecreasing in l,∏(l, w*(l)) will
lso be increasing in l for lb lu*. It follows that if l* denotes the firm's optimal employment choice, l*≥ lu*.
5 To simplify the argument, I assume that w*(l ) wT (l )N w¯ for the relevant range of l.
4
Now, for lzl⁎; luðlÞ ¼ l⁎u and w⁎ðlÞ ¼
l⁎u
l
w⁎u þ
l−l⁎u
l
 
w¯−
CðlÞ
l
, so that the wage bill is w*(l)l=
lu*wu* + ( l− lu*)w¯−C( l ). Notice that, if we abstract from the last term, this expression implies that, for any
113P. Ruiz Verdú / Economics Letters 96 (2007) 109 115l≥ lu*, if the firmwants to hire an extra worker while avoiding unionization, it only has to increase the wage
bill by w¯. The reason is that, when l≥ lu*, any additional worker hired only increases workers' total payoff
in case of unionization by w¯: since the new hire would not affect the union-negotiated wage or
employment level, it would only increase the number of skilled workers who lose their job– and, thus, earn
w¯ – after unionization. Therefore, for l≥ lu*,∏( l, w*( l ))=R( l )−w*( l)l=R( l )− lu*wu*− ( l− lu*)w¯+C( l), so:
PVðl;w⁎ðlÞÞ ¼ RVðlÞ− w¯ þ CVðlÞ ð7Þ
In the absence of a union threat, the firm would choose the level of employment lc such that R′(lc)= w¯.
It follows from this last expression and Eq. (7) that, as long as C′≥0, ∏′(lc, w*(lc))≥0 and, by strict
vity of R, ∏′(l, w*(l))N0 for lb l . Therefore, l*≥ l , and l*N l if C′(l )N0. The followingconca c c c c
proposition summarizes the argument.
Proposition 2. Let l* be the optimal employment level and lc the competitive employment level. Then
l*≥ lc.
It is worth noting that the overemployment result in Proposition 2 does not depend on the specific
choice of bargaining model. It can be shown that the result holds for more general specifications of the
union's objective function and for a large family of bargaining models that includes the two other
main collective bargaining models, namely the right-to-manage and the efficient bargaining models.6
What drives the overemployment result are properties (A)–(C) in Lemma 1, which, essentially, follow
from the assumption that the marginal revenue product of labor is decreasing in the level of
employment.
Although the standard union threat model predicts that employment will fall as a consequence of the
threat of unionization, it should be noted that there is a precedent for the positive threat effect in
Proposition 2. Using a different modelling strategy (in which coalitions of workers can form a union and
select a wage–employment pair from a set of exogenously-given possible bargaining outcomes), Dickens
(1986) showed in a working paper that the threat of unionization could lead to an increase in employment
under certain conditions regarding the ability of coalition workers to discriminate against noncoalition
workers.
6. Conclusion
It has long been recognized that the threat of unionization is likely to affect nonunion firms' wage policies.
In particular, union threat models have proposed that nonunion firms will increase wages above competitive
levels to dissuade workers from joining unions. In this paper, I argue that the same logic applies to
employment choices: nonunion firms should set their employment levels taking into account the impact of
their choices on workers' incentives to organize. To the extent that employers do take into account the effect
of employment on prospective unionization, I show that the threat of unionization, despite raisingwages as in
6 For a review of theses models, see Booth (1995, ch. 5).
5
standard union threat models, will increase employment above the competitive level, in contrast to the
prediction of those models.
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ppendix A
roof of Lemma 1. The standard monopoly union problem with no restrictions on lu can be stated as:
max
lu;wu
luðwu− w¯Þ
0 0 0s
Con
an be
If lu
R
For
u≤R
s
Pro
q. (9:t: RðluÞ−wuluzRðl uÞ−wul u; for any l uV0 ðPAÞ
cavity of R implies that the restriction can be replaced by the F.O.C.: R′(lu)=wu, so problem (PA)
rewritten asmax
lu
luðRVðluÞ− w¯Þ ðP0AÞ
Making the standard assumption that problem (P′) is concave, its solution, l*, is given byA u
Vðl⁎uÞ − w¯ þ l⁎uRWðl⁎uÞ ¼ 0 ð8ÞR
Let w*≡R′(lu*) and let lc be defined by R′(lc)= w¯. Strict concavity of R implies that wu*N w¯ and lu*b lc.is constrained to lie below l, the union solves problem (PB):max
lu;wu
luðwu− w¯Þ
s:t: luVl ð9ÞðluÞ−wuluzRðl VuÞ−wul0u; for any l0uV1 ð10Þanywu≤R′(l),R″b0 and Eq. (10) imply that lu= l. Therefore, it cannot be optimal for the union to set
′(l), (since wu=R′(l) guarantees the same level of employment). Now, if the union sets wu≥R′(l) for
then l will satisfy R′(l )=w , so the union's problem becomes:ny l, u u u
max
lu
luðRVðluÞ− w¯Þ ðP′BÞ:t: luVl ð9Þ
blem (P′B) is identical to problem (P′A) with the addition of constraint (9). Therefore, if lu* satisfies
), then it is a solution to problem (P′B). Thus lu(l)= lu* and wu(l)=wu* for l≥ lu*, proving (B.2). Now,
6
the concavity of problem (P'A ) ensures that R'(lu)− w¯− luR"(lu)N0 for lub lu*. That is, the marginal benefit
for the union of increasing employment is positive for lub lu*. Therefore, for lb lu*, lu(l)= l and wu(l)=R'(l),
proving (B.1). (A) follows from the concavity of R and the fact that for lb lu*, wu(l)=R′(l), and, for l≥ lu*,
wu(l)=wu*.
Finally, note that for lb lu*, ∏U(l)=R(lu(l))− lu(l)wu(l)=R(l)− lR′(l), which is increasing in l due to the
concavity of R; and, for l≥ l*,∏U(l)=R(lu(l))−lu(l)wu(l)=R(l*)− l*R′(lu*), which is constant in l. This proves
(C). □
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